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TECHNOLOGY, CORPORATE MOBILITY,

AND
A DECLINE IN URBAN SERVICES
Marcus D. Pohlmann

Arkansas State University

Abstract
Technological changes have produced a postindustrial
economy which has both facilitated and encouraged the flight of
capital and well-to-do people from the older industrial cities.
Left in their wake are increasing levels of unemployment,

poverty, and crime. Service needs have Increased accordingly,
but at a time when these cities have not only smaller tax bases
but also less electoral clout with which to acquire additional
financial assistance at the state and federal levels. In a nearly
futile attempt to reestablish a healthy degree of private
investment in their cities, municipal governments let service
levels decline and focus on spurring capital accumulation.
Introduction
Technological changes in production, transportation, and
communication have given rise to the postindustrial economy.
Corporations, no longer tied to a particular geographic location, are now
free to move to a less expensive environment. And those individuals and
families who can afford it are apt to live in the suburbs, even when they
continue to work in the city. Thus as industries mechanize or leave the
oldest and largest cities of the Northern United States, the ranks of the
urban poor Increase while their economic opportunities decline.
Meanwhile, their host cities face ever-greater demands for services
while their tax bases decrease.
The implications of these developments for the service-dependent
poor of the inner-city and for the cities they inhabit are considered in the
light of theories presented by James O'Connor, Frances Fox Piven, and

Richard Cloward.
a. Conceptual Framework

James YConnor (1973) has developed a theory that adds a political
dimension to these events. He argues that capitalist economies require
two contradictory functions of their governments. He calls the first the
"accumulation" function. Here government attempts to guarantee an
adequate supply of venture capital and productive labor, so that the
capital-owing class can and will Invest In ways that will lead to stable
economic growth, e.g., by offering corporations tax abatements and
subsidies ("social Investment"), as well as roads, sewers, and so on
("social consumption") to provide the necessary Infrastructure for
production. He also refers to the "legitimation" function, whereby
government compensates those who become economically dislocated as the
economy grows, e.g., by providing social-welfare programs ("social
expenditures") and Increased maintenance services. This helps secure
the necessary level of social harmony. Then as the ownership of capital
becomes more concentrated and mobile, the capitalist class can coerce the
government into assuming even more of the costs of capital accumulation
and production, while the benefits remain largely private. This requires
that the government spend increasingly more on social expenditures In
order to retain legitimacy with non-owners. The result Is an
ever-increasing fiscal strain on the government, as It must increase
spending on accumulation and legitimation, even though its revenues are
limited.
The work of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1971) addsa
historical perspective to O'Cnnor's viewpoint. In view of the fact that
the health of capitalist economies depends ultimately on the profitability
of their private corporations, Piven and Cloward suggest that
governments such as the United States, for example, have tended to redue
legitimation expenditures In favor of accumulation spending whenever
possible. At certain points, however, the lower classes rebelled both In
the streets and at the ballot box. Government responded with repression,
but it was also forced to alter its priorities. Thus social expenditures
were Increased In order both to quell unrest and to legitimate the system;
yet once the turmoil subsided, this aid was once again gradually redirected
Into accumulation expenditures.
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b.Fous
By combining these concepts and extending them, it is possible to
outline particular dilemmas faced by the United States' twelve largest
Northern cities. Sometimes referred to as the "Troubled Twelve," these
cities are Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee,
Newark, New York City, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and
Washington, D.C.
Technological advances have allowed once concentrated corporate
capital to become mobile, and thus is able to demand increased
accumulation assistance. At the same time, both the central-city poor and
the bureaucrats which have arisen to provide the legitimation services
have begun to organize themselves to protect their periodic gains.
Therefore, city governments are locked in a vicious cycle. They are
required to spend increasing amounts of money to boost capital
accumulation, while it becomes increasingly difficult to retrieve the
social expenditures surrendered during the previous rounds of civil
unrest. The precise nature of the immediate dilemma, as well as local
government's response to it, will be discussed below.
Technological Change and Postindustrial Cities
When a society acquires the technology necessary to perform
large-scale manufacturing it is said to be industrialized.
Industrialization requires that factories be located near to specific
natural resources, work forces, and markets. Thus large cities arise in
locations that allow manufacturers to obtain the materials necessary for
large-scale production. These cities then grow in size as people come in
search of the opportunities for employment that industrialization has
created for managers, skilled artisans, and unskilled manual workers.
The beginning of the postindustrial period (roughly 1920-present)
can be distinguished by the introduction of such technological
developments as automated assembly lines, automobiles, airplanes,
computers, and telecommunications.
Considering automobiles, for example, the number of Americans
owning cars has increased steadily, from a few thousand at the turn of the
century to millions In the postindustrial period. Consequently the

development of the automobile and interstate highways did much to
facilitate the decentralization of the nation and its metropolitan centers.
Additionally, the development of high-speed air travel and advanced
telecommunications - via the Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS lines),
teleconferences, and the like - further facilitated this dispersion. Among
other things, such technologies have freed many companies from the
necessity of locating near specific workers, markets, waterfronts, and
related businesses. In addition, the workplace has become further
mechanized with the introduction of computers and robotics (Faux, 1983.
New York Times, 1983c). These developments have serious implications
for this society's industrial cities in general, and those cities' work
forces and political power structures in particular (Condit, 1974;
Goldmark, 1972; Marx, 1964; Rae, 1971; Tabb, 1984a).
Postindustrial Cities
Populaion.EFight, Technological innovation made possible the rapid
increase in the number and size of inland cities throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. Innovations in transportation, for example, also
allowed affluent workers to live outside the congested and deteriorating
"inner ring" Immediately surrounding a city's downtown area. From
small "pedestrian cities" clustered around a fort or waterfront, cities
were becoming "distended metropolises" extending more than twenty
square miles, functionally segregated and reaching outward In a
star-shaped fashion along the various transportation lines.
Figure 1 Here
Figure I Indicates the chronology and pace of American urbanization,
and these population trends provide a rather clear index of the rise and
decline of this country's older Industrial cities. The largest cities of the
North have witnessed a net loss in the number of their Inhabitants in the
postindustrial period, while the national population has continued to
increase.
The suburbs have become the fastest-growing areas in the nation,
attracting central-city residents, as well as a number of nonmetropolitan
people who previously would have been unlikely to migrate into the
central city. In addition, although census data have yet fully to reflect it,
studies are beginning to show that a considerable number of people have
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opted to move entirely away from the Immediate metropolitan areas, In
favor of small towns within commuting distance of their jobs (Fuguitt,
1979).
People also seem to have moved away from the Frost Belt (the U.S.
Census Bureau's Northern and Eastern states) and into the Sun Belt
(Southern and Western states) to the point where the population of the
latter region has been increasing at arate almost six times faster than the
former. Or, to put it another way, 86 percent of the U.S. population
increase in the 1970s occurred in the Sun Belt (especially California,
Florida, and Texas), and that figure rose to over 90 percent In the first
half of the 1980s.
It also should be noted that not only are more Americans leaving the
cities than are coming to live In them, but the average income of those
who leave clearly exceeds that of both those who come and those who have
remained. This trend is estimated to have cost cities at least $48 billion
in purchasing-power/texable income between 1970 and 1976 alone
(Barabba, 1976).
Industril Flight Manufacturers, on the other hand, are now free to
escape the high cost of locating in the downtown sector of the older cities.
Many Industrial firms have moved because the transportation and
communications revolutions allowed them the benefits of agglomeration,
economies of scale, and trade efficiency without clustering in the center of
the older waterfront cities (Brown, 1974: 36-69; Mills, 1972:
1-20).
Jobs left the Troubled Twelve In the 1960s at well over twice the
rate of their population flight. New York City, for example, lost 32
percent of its manufacturing plants between 1958 and 1972; Detroit 29
percent; St. Louis 32 percent; and Baltimore 24 percent. As a result,
manufacturing jobs disappeared, e.g., New York City lost 18 percent of its
manufacturing jobs between 1960 and 1970.
By the 1980s, however, the Troubled Twelve were once again gaining
jobs as fast or faster than they were losing them, yet the nature of this
reversal is Important to note. What have been Increasing are
white-collar jobs In the professions and services. However, such atrend
Is problematic for at least two reasons.
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First, when Philadelphia, for example, lost one hundred blue-collar
manufacturing jobs, seventy of them had been held by city residents.
When, however, it added one hundred white-collar office jobs, only thirty
were held by city residents. Thus the present labor-market shift has led
to a situation In which only about half the Jobs found in the Troubled
Twelve are held by residents of those cities.
Thus unemployment has become a way of life for many residents of
the Troubled Twelve. Except for the years in the 1960s, immediately
following Lyndon B.Johnson's War on Poverty, these cities have absorbed
a disproportionate share of the Nation's unemployed since the end of
World War II. Furthermore, it is important to note that unemployment
figures understate the problem. For the old central cities in particular,
unemployment figures can be doubled if "discouraged workers" - those no
longer looking for work - and black teenagers are Included (National
Urban League, 1977:1 ; PURPO, 1979: 43).
Second, 43 percent of the Jobs in the Troubled Twelve were blue
collar by the end of the 1970s, only some of which are in the "primary
labor market" (Brown and Hymer, 1977). Thus many of those fortunate
enough to have found work, toll in the less attractive "secondary sector"
of the labor market. Here they are employed primarily by small-scale
service-producing businesses, where unionization Is rare, wages are
low, benefits are often nonexistent, and their job futures are tenuous at
best. As early as 1970, a U.S. Bureau of the Census survey of fifty-one
urban areas found 60 percent of those employed not making enough for a
"decent standard of living," with half of them not earning even
poverty-level incomes. They also found that in New York City when
discouraged workers,
involuntary part-timers,
and those
underemployed are combined, "subemployment" was somewhere in the
vicinity of 40 to 67 percent (Spring, 1977). Thus, there would seem to
be far less likelihood of today's ghetto residents working their way out of
the underclasses by means of the primary labor market, despite their
documentedwillingness towork (Hilaski, 1971: 45-52; Ryscavage and
Willacy, 1968: 15-21 ; New York Times, 1983b).
Acase in point is Barberton, Ohio, where the 1981 closing of alarge
industrial plant cost hundreds of workers their jobs. More than a yer
later, 20 percent had managed to find comparable jobs, 40 percent had
177

acquired "low-paying, low security" jobs, while the remaining 40
percent were still unemployed (Akron Beacon Journal Magazine. 1983).
Where have the manufacturers gone? They, too, have headed for the
open suburbs and the Sun Belt.
In 1970 alone, St. Louis saw forty-three corporations move to its
suburbs. Between 1970 and 1972, Boston lost seventy-five companies,
Cleveland lost Stouffer Foods Frozen Food Division, National Screw and
Manufacturing, National Copper and Smelting, and the headquarters of the
B.F. Goodrich Chemical Company, among others, while Detroit lost & S.
Kresge, Delta and Pan American Airlines, R. L. Polk Publishers, and
Circus World Toys. Additionally, looking at the period between 1939 and
1969, Cleveland's share of its metropolitan are's blue-collar jobs
declined from 85 to 56 percent, Chicago's from 86 to 56, and Newark's
from 48 to 25.
Northern cities have also witnessed industries expanding in the Sun
Belt, e.g., Republic Steel in Alabama, ITT in Florida, and Phillip Morris
in Phoenix and Los Angeles. In addition, entire corporations have been
lost to the Sun Belt, e.g., Cleveland lost Westinghuse Electric to
Vicksburg (Mississippi), Diamond Shamrock Corporation to Texas,
Multigraph Corporation to Los Angeles, Harris Corporation to Melbourne
(Florka), and Packard Electric Company to Mississippi.
The Sun Belt's share of all new nonagricultural jobs increased from
57 percent in the 1960s to 73 percent in the 1970s. And in terms of
blue-collar positions, the Sun Belt gained 1.2 million such jobs in the
1970s, while the Northern states lost 900,000.
Lastly, another shift is under way which could well prove to be the
most significant of all. As the President's Urban and Regional Policy
Group ( 1979: 24) stated,
Foreign industrial competition has grown in America and has had
a growing impact on the domestic economy and cities. The United
States Is losing manufacturing Jobs to foreign countries,
especially in labor-intensive Industries...Air freight today is
fast and relatively cheep, so foreign workers can perform
labor-intensive steps related to production, while domestic
178

workers carry out the skilled or capital-intensive steps.

In the wake of this postindustrial population and business flight are
left a host of social pathologies, such as Increasing rates of school
dropouts, crime, and poverty.
InadMuate Education. As far as training the unskilled, so that they
can compete effectively for high-paying white-collar positions, the
nation has made considerable progress in terms of educating its
population. The central-city high school dropout rate, for example,
declined from 83.4 percent in 1940 to 46.4 percent in 1970.
Nonetheless, whereas in 1940, residents of the Troubled Twelve dropped
out of high school at a rate of 77.8 percent - less often than urban
dwellers in the rest of the country - their rate of 57.1 percent was well
above the national average in 1970. Yet even if they do graduate, the
quality of most public schools in the center of these declining areas tends
to be questionable at the very best (Gordon, 1977: 206-271 ).
Crime,
Harvey Brenner (1976), doing research for the
Congressional Joint Economic Committee, found rather clear correlations
between unemployment and crime. And as urban crime trends imply, a
sizable number of inner-city residents are apparently turning to the
"irregular" job market.
Whereas crime rates rose steadily across the United States between
1960 and 1980, they soared in the inner cities. Violent crime in the
Troubled Twelve, for example, was three times the national average
during the I960s and 1970s. And even though national and urban crime
rates began declining In the early 1980s, the absolute and relative crime
levels of the Troubled Twelve scarcely place these cities in a position to
attract or to retain Industrial corporations and more financially secure
inhabitants.
Poverty- The 1979 President's Urban and Regional Policy Group
report indicated that poverty was declining everywhere in the nation,
except in the large central cities, where real incomes had actually
decreased. (PURPO,1979: 35, 43). By the mid- 1980s, more than one
out of every five central-city residents lived below the federal
government's poverty level, and the figure was significantly higher in a
number of the Troubled Twelve cities. Focusing on the Troubled Twelve,

median family income declined 13.5 percent in constant dollars between
1970 and 1980, while the poplulation below the poverty level increased
by nearly 30 percent, from 15.9 to 20.5 percent. In addition, the
government's definition of poverty excludes many who could reasonably
be placed in that category (PURPO, 1979: 43; New York Times, 198 ]a,
1981 b, 1983a).
Fiscal Crisis and Corporate Power
The President's Urban and Regional Policy Commission (1979)
concluded that such changes have
left many people and places with severe social and economic
problems - and without the resources to deal with them. For
example, many areas which have lost both jobs and people face a
declining tax base and mounting public costs resulting from the
need to serve increasing numbers of poor residents, maintain
deteriorating infrastructures, and revitalize substandard
communities.

Expeniture. To begin with, these cities end up spending far more on
city services. For example, once roads, sewers, waterworks, and the like
have been built to serve a population of a given size, maintenance costs do
not decrease simply because people leave. Actually these costs generally
increase as the physical plant ages, and they certainly increase in terms
of cost per capita (Peterson, 1976: 47-51). In addition, more and
better services need to be provided in an attempt to cultivate and maintain
an attractive business climate. As for the people remaining, Demetrios
Caraly ( 1977: 407) has described them as "high-cost citizens." These
are the low-income families, the school-age children of the poor, the
elderly, and others "who are direct consumers of expensive services and
cash benefits like welfare payments, subsidized housing, etc." Finally, it
has become extremely difficult to reduce a city's budget given the decline
In private-sector jobs, an organized and militant public work force, and
pension payments that have become a large and "fixed" short-term
expenditure (Piven, 1977).
Revenues. Setting aside the question of expenditures for the moment,
there are revenue problems. In the late 1970s, William Tabb ( 1984b:

333) estimated that each departing Job took with it between $650 and
$1,035 in local tax revenues. Therefore, when speaking in terms of
cities losing hundreds of thousands of jobs in a matter of a few years,
there are bound to be short falls even if services are only maintained at
their previous levels. As for raising taxes, their residents are already
among the highest taxed in the nation. Moreover, they not only believe
that taxes are presently too high, but have been part of a nationwide
effort to lower the tax rate (Flower, 1974; New York Times, 1975).
Voters across the country have succeeded in passing tax-cut referenda and
have become more likely to vote down tax-increasing ballot issues
(Paterson, 1976: 106; Pfiffer, 1983: 45-56).
City Debt The resulting dilemma becomes visible if one looks at
mounting city debt. Inner cities borrowed heavily to appease their fleeing
industries, affluent upper and middle classes, unionized bureaucrats, and
turbulent poor, as the vicious cycle reached crisis proportions In the
1960s. Gross debt per capita more than doubled in constant dollars
between 1950 and 1970, despite the fact that the combined contributions
of the state and federal governments had more than doubled since 1950
and amounted to roughly 50 percent of municipal revenues. Currently
the deficits have leveled off to some extent, but this is deceptive.
Cities have come to hide their fiscal problems in at least three ways.
First, crucial long-term maintenance expenditures continue to be
postponed Second, they have surrendered a number of functions. For
example, surrounding counties have been absorbing a number of the
duties performed previously by the cities. Thus when it appears that
some cities are faring better then others, it is important to remember
that their counties may be providing services that other cities have to
provide for themselves. As might be expected, the counties encompassing
the Troubled Twelve have been accumulating deficits in a pattern very
similar to their central cities. And third, there is "off-budget financing."
When voters refuse to approve the issuance of new revenue-raising city
bonds, 'public corporations" are created. These corporations are then
able to sell revenue bonds without any form of voter approval, and
neither the spending nor the borrowing of these agencies appears
anywhere In the budgets of the governments that created them. Between
1972 and 1982, over $250 billion was borrowed by means of this
method, whereas less than $54 billion had been borrowed in the
preceding decade (Bennett end DiLorenzo, 1983).
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In the end, greater shares of city and county budgets are spent to pay
the interest on their debts. But even more importantly, this combination
of city and county insolvency has begun to shake investor confidence in
their revenue-raising bonds. Once investors get nervous it is not long
before the cities lose their ability to borrow on the open market. This
development generally means that one of two things is likely to occur.
Either a city will have to pay escalating interest rates if it hopes to
continue borrowing to pay for long-term capital investments and prevent
short-term cash flow problems, or it may be closed out of the borrowing
market entirely, which means that it will soon be on the verge of default
and possible bankruptcy.
The Federal Response. Overall, population shifts have meant a net
loss in electoral clout for the older industrial cities despite
court-ordered reapportionment, and this loss has been reflected most
dramatically aflhe federal level.
In the 1960s, Michael Harrington and others (Harrington, 1971;
Kotz, 1969) documented what many had deduced from the social
turbulence of the period: there was still an alarming number of seriously
indigent people in the United States. And like a festering sore, the
situation was coming to a head as the urban ghettos rocked with unrest. In
the face of this, Lyndon Johnson declared war on poverty. With the help
of Congress, he added a host of relief, education, jobs, training, and urban
redevelopment programs to the welfare-state programs previously
instituted during the 1930s (Piven and Cloward, 1971, 1977). It was
not long, however, before much of this was reduced considerably
(Donovan, 1967).
Following this intermittent and often clumsy effort to achieve the
Oreat Society these programs were altered, as economic and social
policies shifted significantly under two successive Republican
administrations. Instead of categorical grants directed toward the poorest
areas of the nation, block grants and revenue sharing emerged which
allowed a far greater number of areas to compete for federal assistanc
(Newfield and DuBrul, 1981: 43-62; Pressman, 1975). As Frances
Fox Piven and Richard Cloward ( 1977: 356) stated, "Once the turmoil of
the 1960s ebbed, the federal and state governments could and did reduce
grants-in-ald to the older central cities, thereby widening the disparities
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Inthe city budgets even more."
Then, as the American economy struggled in the 1970s, the general
public was anything but ready to launch another "war on poverty." For
Instance, In January 1978, only 41 percent of the self-styled liberals
and 21 percent of the self-identified conservatives favored any increase
in governmental spending on domestic programs (New York Times,
1978a). Accordingly, this sentiment was reflected clearly in the policies
of the Carter and Reagan administrations. As the federal government's
latest burst of new legitimation spending was over, the cities would be
left to their own resourcs.
The Power of Local Caoital
After World War II, technological changes In transportation,
communication, and automation made It possible for increasingly
centralized and internationally dominant U.S. corporations to comb the
globe for more attractive industrial environments. However, they
generally did not take immediate advantage of these opportunites, striking
instead a truce with American labor unions and continuing to make sizable
profits by virtue of their superior International position. As late as
1960, there was little or no Third World production of manufactured
goods for export. Yet In the face of mounting International competition
from Japan and Western Europe, In particular, the economic downturn of
the mid- 1970s seems to have set off what Barry Bluestone and Bennett
Harrison (1982) have called the "hypermobility of capital." Since that
time, many U.S.-based multinational corporations have launched
worldwide searches for production settings that provide cheap and
abundant resources, inexpensive and pliant labor, and a high degree of
political stability, while often times these countries are nothing more
than military dictatorships (Storper and Walker, 1984: 19-22;
Yernon, 1977). Furthermore, some of the last remaining legal
impediments to such mobility have been removed recently by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and federal court decisions (New
York Times, 1984a, 1984c).
The resulting shifts In capital have come In a variety of ways.
Although the overt physical relocation of an entire plant is relatively
rare, such techniques as redirecting profits and depreciation allowances,
relocating pieces of physical capital, laying off workers while contracting
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out their work to cheaper plants, and of course, shutdowns and/or
bankruptcy are quite common (Harrison and Bluestone, 1984).
In a very real sense, the economic fate of a city hangs on the
investment decisions of its largest private corporations. And such
decisions have an enormous impact on the cities, neighborhoods, and
individual citizens involved.
These decisions can, for example, create additional dilemmas for what
is often already a hard-pressed municipal government. The city finds
that departing firms have also taken with them their share of the tax
base, and the newly unemployed can no longer serve as a tax source.
Obviously this has an effect on the number of services that can continue to
be offered to a city's population, not to mention the fact that the need for
social services will increase due to layoffs. In order to remain solvent,
therefore, a city is generally forced to raise taxes and cut services, both
of which drive away even more taxpayers.
For when there is a clear threat of capital disinvestment, city
governments are compelled to grant concessions in order to avoid
bankruptcy. Because the health of a city is dependent upon the
profitability of its private corporations, the corporate elite often do not
have to lift a finger to exert their political will for their interests are
Inherent In the prevailing economic arrangement.
Consider the 3,500 lower-income residents of Detroit's half-white,
half-black Poletown neighborhood. In 1980, General Motors threatened
to locate 6,000 jobs elsewhere if already ailing Detroit would not rue
1,176 Poletown homes, so that a new $600 million Cadillac plant could
be built there. The city had little choice. A number of residents became
concerned and appealed to the mayor, the city council, and the courts, but
to no avail. With the help of millions of dollars In public subsidies 465
acres were to be razed, on which sat 1, 176 homes, 100 small business,
16 churches, 2 schools, and a hospital, so that Cadillacs could soon roll
off these publicly financed assembly lines. In return OM promI
3,000 jobs, "economics permitting."
As capital becomes increasingly more mobile and cities morq
financially crippled, such corporate power will Increase accordingly.
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Declining Servies: Advanced Cases

As the 1970s and 1980s unfolded, city officials were pressured into
accepting significant changes In their public policies, as well as in their
policy-making processes. These changes included cuts in legitimation
services and increases in accumulation incentives. More specifically, as
the reins were pulled in on the welfare state, services to low-income
areas were disproportionately cut and municipal layoffs were felt most by
those last hired and least able to find alternative employment.
New York City and Cleveland are the two cities which reached the most
advanced stages of this phenomenon. In each case, a small group of
bankers led local corporate elites in apolitical coup of sorts, culminating
in aformalization of corporate political power and asignificant alteration
of governmental policies.
New York City
In it's most basic components, New York City's tale of fiscal woe
appears to be a standard one. Between 1950 and 1970 the number of
available jobs remained relatively stable, but the government and service
sectors had become far and away the major growth industries, while jobs
in manufacturing and construction were disappearing most rapidly. For
example, some 80 percent of all new positions available in the 1960s
were found in the public sector. Then between 1970 and 1978 nearly
600,000 Jobs in the private sector disappeared, Including half of the
city's manufacturing positions (450,000 in manufacturing between
1971 and 1976 alone). By 1980, only 15 percent of all payroll
employment was in manufacturing, half of what It had been in 1950.
Thus, it was estimated that of the jobs that would be available between
1981 and 1985, less than 9 percent would be accessible to the 40
percent of New York City's adults who lacked a high school diploma (New
York Times, 198 1c, 1984e).
Meanwhile, the city was also losing population - i.e., 10.4 percent,
or more than 800,000 people, between 1970 and 1980. At the same
time, the city was becoming older, poorer, and more crime-prone. For
example, from 1950 to 1970 the number of elderly residents increased
by 50 percent. Additionally the number of families making less than the
median national income increased from one-third to one-half of the city's
185

more than seven million people. What this means is that I in 7 families
was receiving welfare (at least 90 percent of them eligible recipients),
not to mention those who were not receiving the aid for which they were
eligible. Amidst this poverty, violent crime increased by almost 700
percent between 1960 and 1977. On the average, nearly 1 out of every
60 New Yorkers would annually fall victim to aviolent crime.
Subsequently, in an attempt to meet the service requirements of its
needier inhabitants, the city increased its expense budget between 1961
and 1975 at an annual rate of 12.2 percent, with far more being spent in
the years following the ghetto unrest (1966-1971) than in all the
others combined. In particular, this growth came in the area of social
services. Although the percentage of the city budget devoted to police,
fire, and sanitation actually decreased slightly between 1961 and 1975,
services related to health, education, and welfare increased from one-half
to two thirds. Thus, the city came to be spending at least one-half of its
$12 billion expense budget on legitimation programs, with aquarter of it
devoted to welfare alone. Where welfare had comprised 14.6 percent of
the total city budget in 1961 , by 1975 it came to be 26.7 percent.
In the end, of course, the city budget would not balance. Again
focusing on the decade prior to the crisis that would develop in 1975,
despite a 33 percent increase in local taxation and adoubling of aid from
outside governmental sources, expenditures were still growing three
times faster than revenues. The result was a cumulative (illegal) deficit
in the short-term expense budget which increased from $0.5 to $4.5
billion, not to mention a long-term capital budget debt which increasec
from $5 to $7.8 billion. Combined, these sums amounted to a debt of
$1,936 for every child, woman, and man in the city. Interest peyments
alone had grown to 14 percent of the city's operating budget.
In early March 1975, a delegation of bankers confronted Mayor
Beame, informing him that under present circumstances they would nc
longer be able to lend money to the city. (Although they did continue tc
sell the city's bonds, at least in part to protect their remalnin;
investments in New York City securities by boosting public confidence ir
city solvency). By April, however, the banks were quite openly dumpir
city notes and bonds by selling them for as little as two-thirds of their
face value, thus causing Standard and Poor to suspend the city's "A"bond
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rating. Soon, the city was very close to defaulting as each new payroll

came due.
On June Oth, the state government Intervened. They created the
Metropolitan Assistance Corporation (MAC) which would borrow money
for the city as long as municipal officials proceeded to mend their
misguided ways. The concept, structure, and authority of MAC were
essentially devised by Investment banker Felix Rohatyn and several other
commercial bankers. The corporation's governing board was to include
nine members, all of whom were to be appointed by the governor. As It
turned out, however, eight of the original nine had either banking or
brokerage connections (Newfield and DuBrul, 1978: 178-182).
Furthermore, MAC-backed bonds proved difficult to sell. Thus, in
order to make these Investments secure, the Emergency Finance Control
Board (EFCB) was established on September 9 to remove the city's fiscal
fate even further from the hands of its elected officials. This time the idea
was developed by bankers Rohatyn, William Butcher (Chase Manhattan),
Walter Page (Morgan), Edward Palmer (Citibank), and the sole elected
official in the room, who was Governor Hugh Carey (Newfield and
DuBrul, 1978: 179). It was decided that the control board would consist
of the governor, the state controller, the mayor, the city comptroller, and
three public members appointed by the governor. The public members
turned out to be Role , William Ellinghaus (president of New York
Telephone Company), and David Margolis (president of Colt Industries).
The control board, in consultation with MAC, was to submit a
"financial plan" for the city, based on a review of the operating and
capital budgets, all borrowing, all large vendor contracts, and all union
contracts. Thereafter, the board was to monitor closely the city's
adherence to the plan. In essence, the members of the board were
delegated the final authority over the city's budget In addition, control of
the city's elected officials, and thus of local residents, was reduced even

further by the modus operandi of the city's new governmental structure.
The meetings.of both MAC and the EFCB were closed to the public,
although minutes were kept and guests were occasionally present. These
guests included such members of the corporate elite as Walter Wriston
and David Rockefeller. As for policy making, Robert Greenblatt et a].
(1979) concluded that this new "Super Government" was essentially a
business dominated by a financial elite, whereby corporate goals and
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methods prevailed.
The policy priorities of "the Super Oovernment" were not difficult to
predict. Local investors still held sizable amounts of city securities, e.g.,
local banks held $1.2 billion in regular municipal bonds and $1.1 billion
in MAG bonds. Thus the legislation which created the Emergency Finance
Control Board mandated that debt service was to be "the first priority."
To facilitate both debt service and future borrowing, city policy was
revised.
What did not change were accumulation expenditures. For example,
tax abatements were still extended to private corporations. This was done
primarily through the New York Industrial and Commercial Incentive
Board, created in 1977. As of May 1983, some four hundred projects had
been funded by the board at a cost to the city of hundreds of millions of
dollars in foregone revenues.
What actually were reduced, then, were maintenance and legitimation
expenditures. The city work force, for example, was cut by 20 percent
(61,000 jobs). A wage freeze was declared. Property taxes and bridge
tolls were increased. And after only a half hour of discussion and no
public debate, the mass transit fare was raised 43 percent and free
tuition was ended at the City University of New York merely for what
Rohatyn called "the shock effect" (Newfield and DuBrul, 1978:
184-190; Shefter, 1980: 9-10). The implications of some of these
moves are worth nothing.
School budgets were slashed $262 million at atime when "high-cost"
students - those requiring some form of special education - were
increasing and when roughly one-half of the freshmen entering high
school could be expected to drop out before graduation (up from 36
percent in 1961, and higher yet for black and Hispanic students).
Between 1974 and 1976, 23 percent of the city's (13,000) teachers
were laid off, while the school day was reduced by 90 minutes.
Student/teacher ratios increased from 24 pupils per teacher to 29 in
elementary schools, from 16 to 21 in junior high schools, and from 22 to
30 In senior high schools. Foreign language, history, mathematics, and
social studies electives were eliminated from the high school curriculum.
"Extra programs," e.g., interscholastic sports, adult education, evening
trade schools, accelerated and remedial summer school, etc., were
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roughly cut in half. In addition, in-school health services were reduced
84 percent between 1970 and 1980.
As for health care in general, a visiting committee sponsored by the
United Hospital Fund of New York studied the functioning of seventeen city
hospitals in 1978 and delivered a 155-page report. In it, the committee
stressed the critical shortage of nursing care arising from the cutbacks.
Inparticular, due to cuts In the support staff, nurses were being forced to
spend an inordinate amount of time doing housekeeping, clerical,
messenger, and escort work, which the committee concluded
"substantially reduced the time left for patient care". They even termed
these shortages "life-threatening" in may cases, especially in the
Intensive care and neonatal wards. In addition, half the nurses at Coney
Island Hospital were unlicensed and thus could not give medication.
Patients were subject to waits of up to three and a half hours in
emergency rooms and of four to five hours Insome clinics. Mental-health
care was seen to be plagued by "marked understaffing, poor professional
training, extraordinary shortages of supplies, and poorly maintained
space." An adult psychiatric ward In Harlem was described as "crowded,
grim, dirty, and appalling," with eight beds crowded into a room. And it
was just such conditions that prompted an unprecedented "strike" by a
large group of doctors-in-training, to protest what they felt to be
shortages of physicians, nurses, technicians, and other support personnel
that were "endangering the lives of patients" (New York Times, 1978b,
1984b).
It should also be noted that criminal activity was reaching record
proportions and beginning to shift to middle-income areas, as thousands
of the city's police officers were laid off. In addition, the number of
street cleaners was reduced to the smallest number since 1881.
Finally, the personnel cutbacks in administrative agencies left 51
percent of Hispanic workers unemployed, as well as 40 percent of
previously employed black males. Taxes were raised on one of the
highest-taxed citizenries In the country. And fares and fees were
Increased on a population that was already becoming proportionately
poorer and poorer, especially In the face of federal cutbacks (Time,
1980: 18-19; New York Times, 1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 1984d,
1984e).
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Cleveland
The tale of the plight of Cleveland is esntially the same as that of
New York, with only differences in scale, personalities, and a few tactics
to distinguish It.
Cleveland, like New York, was locked In the throes of a fiscal crisis
cycle. For example, it lost 23 percent of Its business firms and 30
percent of its Jobs between 1958 and 1972. This is compounded by the
fact that it had been losing blue-cellar positions for years, with 20
percent of its manufacturing positions disappearing In the 1970s alone.
Additionally, Cleveland lost over one-third of Its population between
1960 and 1980. At the same time, the rate of violent crime was thirteen
times higher in 1975 than it had been In 1950, leaving city police with a
backlog of more than five thousand arrest orders. Thus, In an attempt to
cope with the resulting service requirements, combined city and county
gross debts came to $ ,500 per resident, Including the city's (illegal)
cumulative expense-budget deficit of more than $52 million.
Nevertheless, Cleveland managed to avert disaster by gradually
surrendering service functions to countywide and regional governance.
Between 1969 and 1979, the city surrendered control over its mass
transit, port authority, sewers, jails, and health and welfare systems.
In the late 1970s a maverick populist mayor by the name of Dennis
Kucinich entered the scene. Throughout his winning campaign he had
lambasted the city's "corporate parasites," calling the executives of the
mammoth Cleveland Trust Bank "the worst of the robber barons" and
declaring that "the banks must be brought under public control." His
other major issue was opposition to the proposed sale of "Muny Light"
(the Municipal Light Company), which had come to be dwarfed by the
privately owned Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI).
InDecember 1978, the banks madetheir move The cityowed $15.5
million to five different banks, and repayment of those specific loans was
due on December 15. The city owed the largest amount to Cleveland Trust
($5 million), yet at one point the bank was apparently willing to strike a
deal. It would refinance the debt, help convince the other banks to do
likewise, and even extend $50 million in new financing, if the major
would sign aresolution promising to sell Muny Light KucInich countered
190

by offering 100 percent collateral (from property and income taxes) if
the banks would simply refinance the $15.5 million about to come due
He even indicated that a private investor had offered to underwrite the
city's debt, and that his administration had agreed publicly to support an
income-tax hike, Nonetheless, Cleveland Trust refused, despite the
mayor's warning that default would prompt major layoffs and service
cuts.
Interestingly enough, Cleveland Trust was one of CEI's three biggest
stockholders, holding 782,798 shares (purchasing 91 ,000 more shares
ten days after the city defaulted), and three of Its directors also sat on the
board of CEI. In addition, Cleveland Trust held most of CEI's $140 million
pension fund. Even though the Federal Reserve Board saw no impropriety
in all of this, Kucinich refused to sell Muny Light because he thought it
was a bad deal for the city.
On December 15, 1978, the city of Cleveland became the first major
city to go into default since the Great Depression. At that point, however,
there was a twist. Rather than forcing the city Into bankruptcy by
demanding payment, thereby surrendering precious decision-making
power to the courts, the banks simply did not move to collect. Through
this manuever, the banks were left in a much stronger position to
"suggest" public policy priorities and to "encourage" city voters to elect
more "responsible" candidates.
With the city in default and under bank receivership, Kuclniah
steered through an income-tax hike, cut 20 percent of the city work
force, and successfully repaid $5 million of the loans on which the city
had defaulted. Yet the banks still refused to refinance the rest of those
loans. In November, a beleaguered Dennis Kucinich was defeated soundly
by Republican Lieutenant Governor George Voinovich.
Within two weeks of Kucinich's defeat, the state legislature passed an
"assistance" package which set up a governing structure similar to that of
New York, an approach Kucinich had ardently resisted. In December of
1979 Mayor Voinovich applied for "fiscal emergency" status, and when
that was granted he galned approval of his "Financial Plan." It named the
following three persons as the public representatives. George Grabner
(chairman and president of Lamson and Sessions Company), Robert Blyth
(executive, National Citibank), and Jackie Presser (at that time a
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vice-president of the Teamsters Union).
Local business elites quickly formed an "Operations Task Force" and
made recommendations to City Hall. More than two-thirds of them were
adopted (Akron Beacon Journal, 1983: E4). For example, social
services would be trimmed and the city would begin making an even
greater effort to gain and/or hold large corporations.
Prospects
What has been suggested thus far is that technological change has
produced apostindustrial economy which has made corporate capital very
mobile and driven older cities Into fiscal crisis. Therefore, the requisites
of corporate profitability have come to prescribe the parameters for
making political decisions in these cities. And even though those who do
not own capital may gain material benefits from a healthy economy, this
entire process precludes a serious challenge to the basic structure of
ownership and power. For In the postindustrial city, if local government
responds to the Interests of the poor by implementing fundamentally
redistributive public policies, this drives the city's private-sector
capital to the suburbs, small towns, Sun Belt cities, or foreign countries.
Such Interest, therefore, must generally be ignored or, at best,
occasionally placated.
Yet as Piven and Cloward (1971, 1977) have indicated, the
service-dpendent underclass becomes Increasingly better informed and
better organized as well, especially when concentrated in segregated
inner-city enclaves. Thus, each time the members of the underclass are
driven to rebel, new legitimation expenditures tend to be added to those
remaining from the last round of placations.
With each new round of underclass turbulence, however, It becomes
increasingly more difficult for the city, state, or federal governments to
remain both successful In the struggle to stimulate capital investment in
their jurisdictions and capable of appeasing their periodically rebellious,
deprived classes. What is uncertain is just how much of this trauma the
American fabric can withstand and how much more government can spend
on subsidies and placations and still maintain the integrity of the present
economic system.
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